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I. INTRODUCTION
2
In Board of Trustees of the School District of Fairfield County v. State, the
South Carolina Supreme Court applied the "plain meaning rule"'3 of statutory
construction to find the General Assembly's practice of overriding gubernatorial
vetoes with less than the affirmative vote of two-thirds of a quorum to be
unconstitutional. 4  Such a method of constitutional interpretation, however, may
1. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21 (emphasis added).
2. 395 S.C. 276, 718 S.E.2d 210 (2011).
3. See Davis v. Cnty. of Greenville, 313 S.C. 459, 463, 443 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1994) (citing
Gilstrap v. S.C. Budget & Control Bd., 310 S.C. 210, 214, 423 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1992)).
4. See Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 279, 284, 718 S.E.2d at 211, 214.
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well have produced a result at odds with the original meaning of the South
Carolina Constitution and its framers' intent regarding gubernatorial veto
overrides. The court's opinion failed to recognize that the facts, though similar
to cases cited as precedent, presented a novel question worthy of an analysis of
the framers' theories and intent, regardless of whether the result would have been
the same.
Even though both Chief Justice Toal and the General Assembly found the
language of the constitution capable of another reasonable interpretation,5 the
majority found a "plain reading" of the language of article IV, section 21 to be
"unambiguous. ', 6 The majority appears to have been so blinded by its bright line
rule that it failed to look beyond the four comers of article IV, section 21 to
address constitutional questions related to the separation of powers, despite its
own mandate to do so.
Upon further review, however, the bright line used to create the Fairfield
formula may be murkier than the originalist arguments the court employed
regarding veto mathematics. Though afforded the opportunity, the court refused
to offer any guidance as to whether its ruling was prospective or retrospective.
The result is uncertainty and instability regarding many existing laws enacted,
not only over gubernatorial vetoes, but also, perhaps, those passed by less than a
majority of a quorum. Additionally, the court has somewhat shifted the balance
of power between the legislative branch and the executive branch without
addressing its own constitutional limitations. Finally, does a logical extension of
the Fairfield formula now impose a participation quorum requirement on all
actions of the General Assembly?
Part II of this Note describes the background of Fairfield, the facts of the
case, the procedural history, and the reasoning employed by both the majority
and the dissent. Part Il, after discussing the constitutional provision at issue in
Fairfield and relevant precedent, analyzes resulting issues and concerns related
to the constitutional separation of powers. Part IV analyzes the impact of the
court's decision, both on existing laws and on legislative procedure. Finally,
Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 2010, the South Carolina General Assembly "passed" Act 308.7 The Act
transferred oversight of the financial operations of the Fairfield County School
5. See id. at 286-87, 718 S.E.2d at 215 (Toal, C.J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Con. Res. 3947,
105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1984); [1984] 2 S.C. HOUSE J. 3466).
6. Id. at 279, 718 S.E.2d at 211 (majority opinion).
7. See id. at 278, 718 S.E.2d at 211 (citing 2010 S.C. Acts 308); see also 2010 S.C. SENATE
J. 992 (indicating that H. 4431 and H. 4432 "were read the third time and having received three
[VOL. 63: 819
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District from a popularly elected Board of Trustees to a finance committee
appointed by the Fairfield County Legislative Delegation.8 Governor Sanford
vetoed the legislation.9
The House of Representatives voted to override Governor Sanford's veto by
a vote of 33-to-10.1 At the time of the vote, a quorum of the House was
present." Although only 43 representatives voted on the matter, 120 members
of the 124 member body were present for roll call.' 2  Having deemed the
Governor's veto to have been overridden in the House, it was then sent to the
Senate for consideration of the Governor's objections.' 3
The Senate voted 1-to-O to override the Governor's veto.'4 Although a
quorum was present, only a single senator voted on the matter. 15 While other
senators agreed with the Governor's position, or otherwise disagreed with the
Act, they abstained, citing "long-held precedent in the Senate where members do
not vote on legislation affecting solely one county, also known as local
legislation. '  Following the 1-to-0 vote, it was noted in the Senate Journal that
"[t]he necessary two-thirds vote having been received, the veto of the Governor
was overridden." 17
The plaintiff, Board of Trustees, filed an action against the State of South
Carolina and the Fairfield County Legislative Delegation in circuit court,
challenging the constitutionality of Act 308.18 The Board alleged that Act 308
was invalid as having been adopted in violation of article IV, section 21 of the
South Carolina Constitution, maintaining that the Governor's veto was not
properly overridden by the requisite two-thirds of each "house" of the General
readings in both Houses, it was ordered that the titles be changed to that of an Act and enrolled for
ratification").
8. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 278, 718 S.E.2d at 211 (citing H.R.J. Res. 135, 118 h Gen. Assemb.,
2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2010)).
9. Id.; see also [2010] 2 S.C. HOUSE J. 1531-32 (placing the Governor's veto message in
the record).
10. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 278, 718 S.E.2d at 211 (citing H.R.J. Res. 135); [2010] 2 S.C.
HOUSE J. 1642-43.
11. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 278, 718 S.E.2d at 211 (citing H.R.J. Res. 135). See generally S.C.
CONST. art. III, § 11 ("[A] majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business .... ").
12. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 278, 718 S.E.2d at 211 (citing H.R.J. Res. 135); see [2010] 2 S.C.
HOUSE J. 1622-24; see also S.C. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("The House of Representatives shall consist
of one hundred and twenty-four members ... .
13. See [2010] 2 S.C. HOUSEJ. 1643.
14. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 278, 718 S.E.2d at 211 (citing S.J. Res. 135, 118th Gen. Assemb.,
2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2010)).
15. Id. (citing S.J. Res. 135); see 2010 S.C. SENATE J. 1571, 1607.
16. Id. (quoting S.J. Res. 135) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 2010 S.C. SENATE
J. 1608 (choosing to have their objections published in the Senate Journal, Senators Matthews,
Jackson, and Anderson cited "serious concerns about the legislation").
17. 2010 S.C. SENATE J. 1607.
18. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 278, 718 S.E.2d at 211.
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Assembly. 19  Both bodies of the General Assembly moved to intervene as
defendants. 20 Having consented to the motion to intervene, the parties jointly
petitioned the South Carolina Supreme Court to hear the case in its original
21jurisdiction.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, after agreeing to hear the case, held by a
4-to-i margin that Act 308 was unconstitutional, and thus invalid, because the
General Assembly did not override the Governor's veto in accordance with the
constitutional requirements.22  Defendant Legislative Delegation and
Defendant/Joint Intervenor Bobby Harrell, as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, jointly petitioned the court for a rehearing, urging it to
reconsider, modify, or vacate its opinion.23 The court subsequently denied the
petition for rehearing,
2 4
B. Justice Kittredge's Opinion for the Court
In concluding that Act 308 was unconstitutional, Justice Kittredge defined
the question before the court: "[W]hat does the constitutional mandate 'two-
thirds of that house shall agree' mean? '25 The court determined that its own
precedent and a "plain reading" of the supposedly "unambiguous" constitutional
provision "compel[led] a construction that the two-thirds requirement means
two-thirds of a quorum 'shall agree.' ''26 In arriving at its decision, the court
noted that this interpretation of the constitutional text was consistent with the
General Assembly's "longstanding understanding and application" of its
authority with regard to veto overrides "until relatively recently.
' 27
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that each house of the
General Assembly, absent a constitutional commitment providing otherwise, is
free to set its own rules of procedure without interference by either the executive
or judicial branches. 28 As such, the court recognized that while the General
19. See id. at 277, 718 S.E.2d at 210. The Board further asserted that Act 308 was invalid in
that it was impermissible special legislation enacted in violation of article Ill, section 34 of the
South Carolina Constitution. Id. at 277, 718 S.E.2d at 210-11. While outside the scope of this
Note, South Carolina's local and special legislation jurisprudence is itself deserving of extensive
review.
20. See id. at 278,718 S.E.2d at 211.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 284, 718 S.E.2d at 214. Having found the Act unconstitutional on the ground
that the veto was not properly overridden, the court did not reach the Board's special legislation
challenge. Id.
23. See Petition for Rehearing at 2, 13, Bd. of Trs. of the Sch. Dist. of Fairfield Cnty. v.
State, 395 S.C. 276, 718 S.E.2d 210 (2011) (No. 27035).
24. Bd. of Trs. of the Sch. Dist. of Fairfield Cnty. v. State, No. 27035, Shearouse Adv. Sh.
No. 37 at 2 (S.C. Oct. 24, 2011).
25. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 279, 718 S.E.2d at 211 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21).
26. Id. (quoting S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21).
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12).
[VOL. 63: 819
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Assembly normally acts by majority vote, 29 in certain instances, the constitution
requires a supermajority to act.30  Noting that the General Assembly's veto
override authority is one such example mandating the heightened vote
threshold,3' the court referenced its decision in Smith v. Jennings, interpreting
the requirement and comparing it to other provisions where a supermajority is
required to act.32 The Smith court, in discussing the juxtaposition of the General
Assembly's veto override authority with other provisions where a heightened
standard was explicitly required,33 stated that "[w]hen the Constitution speaks of
'two-thirds of that house' as the vote required to pass a bill or joint resolution
over the veto of the Governor, it means two-thirds of the house as then legally
constituted, and acting upon the matter." 34 Given that a quorum "possesses the
power of the whole body,"'35 the Fairfield court applied Smith, and the authorities
cited therein, to "manifestly require two-thirds of a quorum to override a
governor's veto.",
36
The court turned next to what it described as the persuasiveness of the two-
thirds voting requirement and the inherent check and balance that it provides.37
Although the executive veto was intended to serve as a check on the General
Assembly's plenary or "allegedly venal' 38 power, the constitution allows the
legislative branch to override this executive action. 39 This specific legislative
power, however, is "limited and circumscribed by the heightened vote
requirement.' '4° Citing Morton, Bliss & Co. v. Comptroller General, the court
emphasized that the heightened vote requirement is necessary when "a greater
29. Id. (quoting S.C. CONST. art. II, § 11).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 279-80, 718 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324, 328, 45
S.E. 821, 823 (1903)).
33. Smith, 67 S.C. at 328, 45 S.E. at 823 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. XV, § 1 ("vote of two-
thirds of all members elected shall be required for an impeachment." (emphasis added)); S.C.
CONST. art. XVI, § 1 ("in proposing amendments to the Constitution, 'two-thirds of the members
elected to each house' must agree thereto" (emphasis added))).
34. Id.
35. Id. ("A quorum, therefore, possesses the power of the whole body in all matters of
business wherein the action of a larger proportion of the entire membership is not clearly and
expressly required. So, ordinarily, when a quorum is present acting, the House is present, acting in
all its potentiality.").
36. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 280, 718 S.E.2d at 212 (citing Smith, 67 S.C. at 328-29, 45 S.E. at
823).
37. See id. at 282, 718 S.E.2d at 213.
38. JAMES LOWELL UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, VOLUME I:
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES 86 (1986) (citing
DAVID DUNCAN WALLACE, THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION OF 1895, at 21-25 (1927)).
39. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21.
40. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 282, 718 S.E.2d at 213.
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number than a mere majority should unite where acts of a certain class of a more
important character than the ordinary subjects of legislation are involved.
' 41
Finally, the court turned to a historical analysis of the legislature's voting
procedure, rejecting the General Assembly's argument that its practice of
overriding vetoes of local legislation with less than the requisite two-thirds of a
quorum was rooted in custom, tradition, and "long-held precedent., 42 Instead,
the court found the purported custom to be nothing more than a "recently
adopted practice. '43 The court further rejected the General Assembly's reference
to, and reliance on, various manuals of legislative and parliamentary procedure
as support for its position that two-thirds of those members "present and voting"
satisfies the constitutional requirement.4" Again, although recognizing the
General Assembly's ability to determine its own procedural rules, the court
found these parliamentary manuals to provide nothing more than "default rules,"
which cannot be invoked or relied uon when the "constitution unambiguously
declares the process to be followed.'
Having noted that a quorum possesses the power of the entire body,' the
court interpreted the two-thirds threshold of article IV, section 21 of the South
Carolina Constitution to require no less than the affirmative vote of two-thirds of
a quorum in order to effectively override a gubernatorial veto.47 Assuming full
membership, the court noted that a minimum quorum requires the presence of
sixty-three members in the House of Representatives and twenty-four in the
Senate. 48 Accordingly, the court calculated that two-thirds of such a quorum
41. Id. at 282, 718 S.E.2d at 213 (quoting Morton, Bliss & Co. v. Comptroller Gen., 4 S.C.
430, 463 (1873), overruled in part by Weaver v. Recreation Dist., 328 S.C. 83, 492 S.E.2d 79
(1997)).
42. Id. at 282-83, 718 S.E.2d at 213.
43. Id. at 283 n.4, 718 S.E.2d at 213 n.4. Notably, however, the majority was relying in large
part on the Plaintiff/Joint Petitioner's disputed, and often incorrect, documentation of votes in the
General Assembly. See id. at 282-83, 718 S.E.2d at 213 (noting that the data relied upon was
provided by the Plaintiff); Final Joint Brief of Defendant/Joint Petitioner Legislative Delegation of
Fairfield County and Intervenors/Joint Petitioners Glenn F. McConnell and Robert W. Harrell, Jr. at
15 n.4, Fairfield, 395 S.C. 276, 718 S.E.2d 210 (No. 27035) [hereinafter Final Joint Brief]
("Defendant/Joint Petitioner has identified 37 inaccuracies in Plaintiff/Joint Petitioner's
chart .... "). Additionally, the court provided no guidance as to what length of time would have
been sufficient to justify judicial recognition.
44. See Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 283, 718 S.E.2d at 214 (rejecting the General Assembly's
attempted reliance on AM. SOC'Y OF LEGISLATIVE CLERKS AND SEC'YS, MASON'S MANUAL OF
LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE (rev. ed. 2000), and THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Manual of Parliamentary
Practice, in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: SECOND SERIES 353 (Charles T. Cullen, ed.,
1988) (as embodied in an unpublished pamphlet on file with the South Carolina Senate, Fairfield,
395 S.C. at 287-88, 718 S.E.2d at 216 (Toal, C.J., dissenting))).
45. Id. at 284 n.5, 718 S.E.2d at 214 n.5 (majority opinion).
46. See id. at 280, 718 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324, 328, 45 S.E.
821, 823 (1903)).
47. Id. at 284, 718 S.E.2d at 214 (citing S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21).
48. Id. (assuming a full membership of 124 members in the House of Representatives and 46
in the Senate); see also S.C. CONST. art. III, § 11 ("[A] majority of each house shall constitute a
quorum to do business .... ).
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requires that a minimum of forty-two house members and sixteen senators must
vote to override in order for a gubernatorial veto to be validly overridden.49
Having received only thirty-three votes in the House, and one in the Senate, the
court held that both veto override votes fell short of the constitutional mandate
such that the Governor's veto of Act 308 was sustained. 50
C. Chief Justice Toal's Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Toal, in her lone dissent, adamantly maintained that the
General Assembly had effectively overridden the Governor's veto of Act 308.51
Agreeing with the principle stated by the majority that, absent a constitutional
provision mandating otherwise, each house in the General Assembly is free to
determine its rules of procedure without the interference of its coordinate
branches, the Chief Justice, instead, took issue with the court's determination
that the constitution expressly provides otherwise with regard to veto overrides.
52
Chief Justice Toal opined that the court's interpretation of article IV, section 21
incorrectly requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of a quorum to override a
veto, in turn dispensing with the court's "long-standing precedent requiring the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of the membership present and acting upon the
matter, so long as a quorum is present to conduct business." 53 She expressed her
belief that the majority's reliance on the total number of affirmative votes cast,
rather than the ratio of votes constitutionally mandated, was misguided and in
conflict with both the constitutional text and the court's precedent.54 The Chief
Justice noted that, under the majority's holding, a vote of 42-to-0 would override
a veto, while a vote of 41-to-I would sustain it.55 Maintaining that the two-thirds
requirement "applies only to those members voting in the presence of a
quorum, Chief Justice Toal interpreted Morton differently than the majority,
placing particular emphasis on the phrase "present and acting."57 She further
relied on language from Smith, which, in addressing the specific constitutional
49. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 284, 718 S.E.2d at 214.
50. Id. For purposes of this discussion, Justice Beatty's concurring opinion is omitted.
While agreeing with the majority's holding that the governor's veto of Act 308 was not validly
overridden, Justice Beatty wrote separately to express his opinion that Act 308 was also
unconstitutional special legislation. See id. at 285, 718 S.E.2d at 214-15 (Beatty, J., concurring).
51. See id. at 285, 718 S.E.2d at 215 (Toal, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Toal, having
determined the veto was validly overridden, also reached the Board's second constitutional
challenge and concluded that Act 308 represented constitutionally permissible special legislation.
See id.
52. See id. at 286, 718 S.E.2d at 215.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id. (citing Morton, Bliss & Co. v. Comptroller Gen., 4 S.C. 430 (1873), overruled in part
by Weaver v. Recreation Dist., 328 S.C. 83, 492 S.E.2d 79 (1997)).
57. See id. (quoting Morton, 4 S.C. at 463).
2012]
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provision at issue in this case, interpreted the two-thirds threshold to "mean[]
two-thirds of the house as then legally constituted and acting upon the matter.,
58
In addition to relying on judicial precedent, Chief Justice Toal also discussed
and emphasized the significance of legislative precedent and tradition, citing
both a floor debate59 and the rules of the respective chambers of the General
Assembly.6° Drafted and established in reliance on the court's decisions in
Morton and Smith, the General Assembly's rules used the "present and voting"
language.61 Further, the Chief Justice noted that the court's precedent aligns
with significant parliamentary authority, which also supports the principle that
legislation may be passed "as long as a quorum is present and those voting meet
the constitutionally prescribed ratio of votes required., 62  Finally, the Chief
Justice, in re-emphasizing the General Assembly's reliance on the court's
precedent for over one hundred years in crafting its rules, as well as the typical
immunity of legislative procedure to judicial review, noted that "the interest of
promoting the stability of existing laws" supported finding "that when a quorum
of the voting body is present, it... effectively overrides a gubernatorial veto
when two-thirds of the votes cast affirm the passage of that bill."
63
III. ANALYSIS
Relying largely on what it deemed to be "a plain reading" of "an
unambiguous constitutional provision,' 64 the court, in Fairfield, interpreted
article IV, section 21 of the South Carolina Constitution to require, at a
58. Id. (quoting Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324, 328, 45 S.E. 821, 823 (1903)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
59. See id. (citing H.R. Con. Res. 3947, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1984);
[1984] 2 S.C. HOUSE J. 3465-69 (recording a floor debate and discussion regarding a point of order
involving then-Representative Toal)).
60. See id. at 287, 718 S.E.2d at 215-16 (citing RULES OF THE SENATE 50; RULES OF THE
HOUSE 10.3(4) (stating that a veto may be overridden by two-thirds vote of those members "present
and voting"), reprinted in 119th GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 2011 SOUTH
CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 254, 315 (Charles F. Reid ed., 92d ed. 2011) [hereinafter 2011
LEGISLATIVE MANUAL]).
61. See id. (citing RULES OF THE SENATE 50; RULES OF THE HOUSE 10.3(4), reprinted in
2011 LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, supra note 60, at 254, 315). For purposes of her analysis, Chief
Justice Toal treated "present and voting" the same as "present and acting." See id.
62. Id. at 287-88, 718 S.E.2d at 216 (citing AM. SOC'Y OF LEGISLATIVE CLERKS AND
SEC'YS, MASON'S MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE § 512.3 (rev. ed. 2000) ("the preferred
parliamentary authority of the South Carolina House of Representatives"); THOMAS JEFFERSON, A
Manual of Parliamentary Practice, in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: SECOND SERIES 353
(Charles T. Cullen, ed., 1988) (as embodied in an unpublished pamphlet on file with the South
Carolina Senate, which consists of "an amalgamated version of the United States Constitution and
Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice," Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 287-88, 718 S.E.2d at 216));
see also United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1892) (sustaining the principle that a quorum
makes valid any action by the House, although an actual quorum might not vote).
63. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 288, 718 S.E.2d at 216.
64. Id. at 279, 718 S.E.2d at 211 (majority opinion).
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minimum, that "two-thirds of a quorum 'shall agree"' in order to pass legislation
over the objection of the governor. 65 The court, however, failed to recognize or
acknowledge that this was indeed a novel question deserving of a detailed
analysis of the constitutional text and the framers' intent. Other constitutional
questions, such as the separation of powers, the political question doctrine, and
the theory of acquiescence, went unaddressed. While the court's interpretation
and outcome might well have been the same (and perhaps even appropriate),
given the significance of the issue and the constitutional territory at stake, as well
as the resulting uncertainty from the court's decision, a more searching and
thorough analysis was required.
A. Textual and Historical Analysis of Article IV, Section 21's
"Unambiguous" Language
Article IV, section 21 mandates that two-thirds of each house of the General
Assembly "shall agree" in order to pass a bill or joint resolution over the
objection of the governor. 66  However, given the traditional "canon of
construction 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' [which] holds that 'to
express or include one thing implies the exclusion of another, or of the
alternative,"' 67 it is important to look at not only what language was included in
the text of article IV, section 21, but also what was considered and rejected.
First, it is important to note that the constitutional framers, at both the
Constitutional Conventions of 1868 and 1895, were familiar with a variety of
other phrases and methods by which to require increased participation and/or
assent to act. This awareness is evidenced by the fact that the framers were
presented, at one point or another and in various contexts, with numerous
different voting thresholds and requirements. 69 Considering the court's holding
in Fairfield in light of phrases either adopted or rejected by the constitutional
framers in various contexts, 70 noticeably absent from article IV, section 21 are
65. Id. (quoting S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21).
66. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21.
67. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 86, 533 S.E.2d 578, 582 (2000) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999)).
68. See Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324, 328, 45 S.E. 821, 823 (1903) (quoting S.C. CONST.
art. XV, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1). See generally Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v.
City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 210 (Ala. 2005) (recognizing the utility of looking to evidence
from constitutional conventions for support of original understanding of disputed constitutional
provisions).
69. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 32 (1895) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF 1895 CONVENTION] ("a vote of two-thirds of the
members present") (emphasis added); id. at 56 ("any item or section of said bill not approved by the
Governor shall be passed by two-thirds of the members elected to each of the two houses of the
General Assembly") (emphasis added); id. at 72 ("the concurrence of two-thirds of the whole
representation in each House of the General Assembly") (emphasis added).
70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
20121
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the terms "quorum" and "vote." 71  Had the framers of the South Carolina
constitution of 1895 intended the veto override provision to require two-thirds of
an actual or minimum quorum 72 to affirmatively vote, rather than simply
73 74acquiesce or agree, they could have expressly required as much. Such an
omission by the framers is necessarily presumed to be intentional.75
When viewed in the context of other constitutional provisions, it is worth
noting that the framers were also familiar with a method of requiring, not only a
particular ratio for quorum and voting thresholds, but a specific numerical
requirement as well. As such, the framers' failure to impose a specific
numerical, rather than fractional, requirement on the General Assembly with
respect to both a quorum and the votes needed for specific actions, must also be
taken into consideration when examining article IV, section 21 in light of the
constitution's context and structure. Perhaps making this comparison more
significant is the fact that many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
of 1895 were reco nized as having been former or current members of the
General Assembly. 178
Article IV, section 21's use of the term "agree, rather than the perhaps
more explicit term "vote," may also be of particular significance.7 9 The term
agree arguably indicates the delegates' recognition of the historic parliamentary
and democratic theory regarding acquiescence, a theory previously referenced
and acknowledged by the South Carolina Court of Constitutional Appeals in
1821.80 While the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1895 imposed
on themselves a duty to vote, 81 an obligation they obviously declined to impose
71. See S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21.
72. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 23, at 7 (discussing potential "absurd results"
under the Fairfield formula).
73. See State v. Deliesseline, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 52, 62-63 (1821) (citing Rex v. Foxcroft,
(1760) 97 Eng. Rep. (K.B.) 683, 685).
74. See Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324, 328, 45 S.E. 821, 823 (1903).
75. See Morton, Bliss & Co. v. Comptroller Gen., 4 S.C. 430, 466 (1873) ("The inference is
that the omission was intentional."), overruled in part by Weaver v. Recreation Dist., 328 S.C. 83,
492 S.E.2d 79 (1997).
76. See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 2 ("The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and four
Associate Justices, any three of whom shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business....
In all cases decided by the Supreme Court, the concurrence of three of the Justices shall be
necessary for a reversal of the judgment below.").
77. See JOURNAL OF 1895 CONVENTION, supra note 69, at 9-10 (addressing the Convention,
Governor John Gary Evans, after his election as President of the Convention, stated: "The
legislative department needs your serious consideration; but I deem it useless to go into an extensive
discussion of that department, as I see before me many delegates who have been for years members
of the House and Senate.").
78. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21.
79. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
80. See State v. Deliesseline, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 52, 62-63 (1821) (citing Rex v. Foxcroft,
(1760) 97 Eng. Rep. (K.B.) 683, 685).
81. See JOURNAL OF 1895 CONVENTIoN, supra note 69, at 29 ("Every member who shall be
within the bar of the Convention when a question is stated from the Chair shall vote thereon .... ).
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on the members of the General Assembly, the convention did, on its twenty-first
day, adopt a rule permitting delegates to "pair" on questions presented to the
convention. Such a rule, recommended after the rules of the convention had
been established, adopted immediately,
83 and utilized frequently thereafter, 84
may perhaps imply that the convention later required less than an affirmative
vote from each delegate in order to conduct business.
Having cleary adopted the word "vote" elsewhere in the constitution and its
drafting process, its omission from article IV, section 21 must presumably have
been intentional. 86 Requiring only that two-thirds of each house "agree" 87 rather
than "vote," especially where voting itself is not compelled by the body,88 may
arguably be interpreted as legitimizing or recognizing the General Assembly's
practice of viewing abstention as merely acquiescence in the will of those
present and voting.
B. Analysis of Precedent
The South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted constitutional provisions
requiring "a supermajority of the legislature to act ' 89 on three other occasions. 90
Although the court, prior to Fairfield, had never addressed or been presented
with the novel issue of the constitutional validity of a veto override vote with
less than two-thirds of a quorum voting to override, further analysis of the
court's precedent is instructive. Moreover, given the significant weight afforded
these cases by the majority in Fairfield, further analysis is required in order to
illustrate the simplicity of the court's treatment of the precedent as having
controlled the truly unique issue it was asked to address.
82. See id. at 321 (stating that in cases where a delegate was absent from the convention, he
was allowed to "pair" with a present delegate who was then required to "state how he would have
voted if the other party to the pair had been present").
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., id. at 599-600 (counting the paired votes and stating how, if not paired, the
delegate would have voted).
85. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
86. See Morton, Bliss & Co. v. Comptroller Gen., 4 S.C. 430, 466 (1873), overruled in part
by Weaver v. Recreation Dist., 328 S.C. 83, 492 S.E.2d 79 (1997).
87. See S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21.
88. See RULES OF THE HOUSE 7, reprinted in 2011 LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, supra note 60, at
302-06.
89. Bd. of Trs. of the Sch. Dist. of Fairfield Cnty. v. State, 395 S.C. 276, 279, 718 S.E.2d
210, 211 (2011).
90. See Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324, 328, 45 S.E. 821, 823 (1903); Walker v. State (Bond
Debt Cases), 12 S.C. 200, 281 (1879); Morton, 4 S.C. at 463-64.
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1. Morton, Bliss & Co. v. Comptroller General
The court first addressed a two-thirds requirement in Morton.91  The
question presented in Morton was "whether, under [s]ection 7, [a]rticle IX, of the
Constitution [of 1868], it is competent to pass Bills intended to create a public
debt by two-thirds of a quorum of each House, or only by two-thirds of the
whole membership of each House.' 92 The constitutional provision at issue in
Morton was entirely different, however, from the one in Fairfield. While the
court interpreted "two-thirds of that house shall agree, 93 in Fairfield, the court,
in Morton, interpreted a provision that required a bill to "have been passed by
the vote of two-thirds of the members of each branch of the General
Assembly." 94 Given that the provision at issue in Morton is different from the
provision involved in Fairfield, neither the constitutional requirements nor the
cases are apt for direct comparison. Although distinguishable from Fairfield in
the issues it aimed to address, the reasoning and analysis provided by the court in
Morton is instructive nonetheless.
In "conclud[ing] that a vote of two-thirds of the members present at the time
the vote was taken satisfies the requirements of the Constitution," 95 the court
noted that "[ijf the rule is the mere majority rule, then a majority of the quorum
present and acting is intended; if the rule is that of two-thirds, then two-thirds of
such quorum must concur for effective action." 96 While the majority in Fairfield
relied on the second half of the above statement-that "if the rule is that of two-
thirds, then two-thirds of such quorum must concur for effective action"9 7-it
neglected to apply the prefatory language of "present and acting" to the portion it
quoted and on which it relied. Although again presented with the issue of what
constituted two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly under the South
Carolina Constitution of 1868 in the Bond Debt Cases,98 the court referred toMorton as controlling the question.99
2. Smith v. Jennings
Following the Bond Debt Cases, it was not until 1903, in Smith v.
Jennings, 10 that the court again sought to interpret a constitutional supermajority
91. See Morton, 4 S.C. at 462.
92. Id.
93. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 279, 718 S.E.2d at 211 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21).
94. Morton, 4 S.C. at 462 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (1868)).
95. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
97. See Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 281, 718 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting Morton, 4 S.C. at 463)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Walker v. State (Bond Debt Cases), 12 S.C. 200 (1879).
99. See id. at 281 (citing Morton, 4 S.C. 430).
100. 67 S.C. 324,45 S.E. 821 (1903).
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requirement, this time under the South Carolina Constitution of 1895.11 The
question presented in Smith was whether, in the context of the General
Assembly's constitutional veto override authority, "the language 'two-thirds of
that house' means two-thirds of the total membership of the Senate. . . and two-
thirds of the total membership of the House of Representatives ... or means two-
thirds of the members of each of said bodies voting upon the question, a quorum
being present."102 In Smith, the General Assembly had declared the Governor's
veto overridden following votes of 28-to-13 in the Senate and 60-to-25 in the
House of Representatives. 10 3 Having found that the House of Representatives
was "lawfully constituted'1 °34 at the time of the veto override vote (given that a
quorum was present), the court, in Smith, held that the vote satisfied the "two-
thirds of that house" as required by the constitution. In arriving at its
conclusion, the court stated that "[w]hen the Constitution speaks of 'two-thirds
of that house' as the vote required to pass a bill or joint resolution over the veto
of the governor, it means two-thirds of the house as then legally constituted and
acting upon the matter.' 1°6 The court further noted that "[w]henever the framers
of the Constitution intended otherwise, the purpose was expressly declared."
1 7
While not perfectly on point, in that the court was neither presented with, nor did
it reach, the question of the constitutional sufficiency of a vote amounting to less
than two-thirds of a quorum, Smith nonetheless established the rule that "[w]hen
the Constitution speaks of 'two-thirds of that house' as the vote required to pass
a bill or joint resolution over the veto of the governor, it means two-thirds of the
house as then legally constituted and acting upon the matter."
108
Although having, perhaps, stated the rule by which to determine the validity
of a veto override vote, the court left room for further interpretation in the phrase
"as then legally constituted and acting upon the matter. ' 1°9 A quorum of each
house having been deemed to "possess[] the power of the whole body" such that,
when present, each chamber is "legally constituted" and "acting in all its
potentiality,"' 10 results in the lingering question: what constitutes "acting upon
101. See id. at 327, 45 S.E. at 822 (interpreting S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 23 (renumbered 1973)).
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. See id.
104. Id. at 328, 45 S.E. at 823.
105. See id. at 329, 45 S.E. at 823 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 23 (renumbered 1973)).
106. Id. at 328, 45 S.E. at 823 (emphasis added).
107. Id. ("[A]s in [article 15, § 1], 'a vote of two-thirds of all members elected shall be
required for an impeachment,' and in [article 16, § 1], where in proposing amendments to the
Constitution, 'two-thirds of the members elected to each house' must agree thereto." (quoting S.C.
CONST. art. XV, § 1 & XVI, § 1)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also Morton, Bliss & Co. v. Comptroller Gen., 4 S.C. 430, 463 (1873) (citing
S.C. CONST. art II, § 14 (1868)) (stating that a quorum "is competent to transact all business not
embraced in certain special provisions requiring for action the concurrence of a greater number of
votes than the number required to constitute such quorum"), overruled in part by Weaver v.
Recreation Dist., 328 S.C. 83, 492 S.E.2d 79 (1997).
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the matter"?'" While ultimately rejected by the majority in Fairfield, the
argument remains valid, based on an interpretation of the rules laid down in
Morton and Smith,112 that, should the act of voting be considered to be or amount
to "acting upon the matter," 1 3 the concurrence of two-thirds of those "present
and acting" 14 would satisfy the constitutional requirements, provided that a
quorum was present. 115  Additionally, despite the court in Fairfield having
applied Smith to "manifestly require two-thirds of a quorum to override a
governor's veto," 116 Smith may have simply stated that two-thirds of a quorum
was sufficient to do so, as the court in Smith was not asked, nor required, to go so
far as to expressly require more than was necessary to dispose of the
challenge. 117
C. Separation of Powers
1. The South Carolina Constitution
The South Carolina Constitution of 1895 expressly adopts and mandates
enforcement of the doctrine of separation of powers, a principle "that is only
implicit in the Constitution of the United States."119 Article I, section 8 of the
South Carolina Constitution requires that "the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers of the government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other,
and no person or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments
shall assume or discharge the duties of any other."'120 This "separation of powers
mandate" is closely followed by articles III, IV, and V, each of which serves to
"delineate the authority and functions of the three departments of
government."' 12 1 Each branch has certain distinct powers and responsibilities
111. Smith, 67 S.C. at 329, 45 S.E. at 823; see also Morton, 4 S.C. at 463 ("present and
acting").
112. And subsequently relied on, but interpreted differently, in Fairfield. See Bd. of Trs. of
the Sch. Dist. of Fairfield Cnty. v. State, 395 S.C. 276, 280, 718 S.E.2d 210, 212 (2011) (citing
Smith, 67 S.C. at 328-29, 45 S.E. at 823; Morton, 4 S.C. at 462-63).
113. Smith, 67 S.C. at 328, 45 S.E. at 823.
114. Morton, 4 S.C. at 463.
115. See Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 288, 718 S.E.2d at 216 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 280, 718 S.E.2d at 212 (Kittredge, J., majority opinion).
117. See Smith, 67 S.C. at 328-29, 45 S.E. at 823 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 23
(renumbered 1973)) ("As the house at the time of the passage of the joint resolution was lawfully
constituted with eighty-five members present, and as sixty of these voted for its passage, the vote
was 'two-thirds of that house,' in the sense of [article 4, section 23] of the Constitution.").
118. See S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8.
119. Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 212 (Ala.
2005) (citing Opinion of the Justices No. 380, 892 So. 2d 332, 334 n.1 (Ala. 2004)).
120. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8.
121. State ex rel. McLeod v. Yonce, 274 S.C. 81, 84, 261 S.E.2d 303, 304 (1979) (per
curiam).
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that may not be assumed, usurped, or performed by a separate branch. 122 Article
IUI specifically says that "[t]he legislative power of this State shall be vested
in... the 'General Assembly of the State of South Carolina.' ' , 123 One of the
primary reasons and justifications for the constitutional separation of powers is
the inherent benefit of spreading out the responsibility for the operation of the
government, 124 as it is "[tihe legislative department [that] makes the laws; the
executive department [that] carries the laws into effect, and the judicial
department [that] interprets and declares the laws."
' 125
While the general rule regarding the constitutionally required separation of
powers is relatively easy to state, "some difficulty arises in its application."
126
Nonetheless, despite difficulties in applying the separation of powers doctrine,
"the perfection of the system requires that the lines which separate and divide
[the three] departments shall be broadly and clearly defined."' 12? Although some
authorities suggest that there is not an absolute division of powers, but rather a
more cooperative effort among the branches, 128 such an effort among the
branches does not suggest that the judiciary may stray from its constitutionally
defined sphere of authority and assume a legislative role. 129
2. Separation of Powers Concerns Must Be Confronted
As required by the court's own separation of powers jurisprudence, the
majority in Fairfield should have thoroughly addressed and analyzed the relevant
separation of powers concerns before proceeding, 130 irrespective of the effect of
doing so on the court's final disposition of the challenge. 31  While it is the
122. See Bess J. DuRant, Note, The Political Question Doctrine: A Doctrine for Long-Term
Change in Our Public Schools, 59 S.C. L. REV. 531, 537 (2008).
123. S.C. CONST. art. I1, § 1.
124. See State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 278 S.C. 307, 312, 295 S.E.2d 633, 636 (1982) (per
curiam).
125. Yonce, 274 S.C. at 84, 261 S.E.2d at 305.
126. State ex rel. Rawlinson v. Ansel, 76 S.C. 395, 405, 57 S.E. 185, 189 (1907).
127. Culbertson v. Blatt, 194 S.C. 105, 109, 9 S.E.2d 218, 219 (1940) (quoting Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-91 (1880)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. See DuRant, supra note 122, at 538 (quoting Gilbert v. Gladden, 432 A.2d 1351, 1354
n.3 (N.J. 1981)),
129. See Yonce, 274 S.C. at 88, 261 S.E.2d at 306. In finding that the legislature may not
direct a circuit judge to work within the legislative department, the court "recognize[d] that [while]
some overlapping authority has been tolerated by reason of the minimal degree of involvement," the
authority of the judiciary is restricted to its constitutionally defined role. Id.
130. See Culbertson, 194 S.C. at 109, 9 S.E.2d at 219; Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit
Selection Comm'n, 387 S.C. 109, 123, 691 S.E.2d 453, 461 (2010) (per curiam).
131. Aside from acknowledging in passing that, absent a constitutional mandate to the
contrary, "each house in the General Assembly determines its rules of procedure free from
interference from the judicial and executive branches," the court in Fairfield failed to specify or
define the applicable standard of review. Bd. of Trs. of the Sch. Dist. of Fairfield Cnty. v. State,
395 S.C. 276, 279, 718 S.E.2d 210, 211 (2011) (citing S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12).
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court's duty to interpret and declare the meaning of the constitution,"' "[t]here is
[also] no authority save the court to determine when there is and when there is
not a violation of the separation of powers provision of the constitution."'
133
Therefore, determining whether a violation of the requisite separation and
balance of powers has occurred, or would occur if the matter were to be
subjected to judicial review, depends wholly on the court's willingness to
exercise judicial restraint.134 This restraint requires the court to analyze, at the
outset, whether a particular constitutional challenge is within the court's
jurisdiction and can appropriately be subjected to judicial review.
In Culbertson v. Blatt,135 the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized "[a]t
the threshold of the case," that it was "met with issues affecting the fundamental
powers and jurisdiction of [the] Court."' 13 6  Presented in the context of
allegations relating to the constitutional prohibition on dual office holding, 137 the
court, in Culbertson, raised separation of powers concerns sua sponte.138 The
court held that the constitutional challenge was "precluded by a consideration of
the traditional and constitutional division of powers among the legislative,
executive and judicial branches of the government." 139 The court further stated
that the "elementary constitutional doctrine" of separation of powers "puts it
beyond the power of [the] court on a mere allegation that the Legislature has
violated a constitutional mandate, to issue a prohibitive or other injunctive or
mandatory decree which would have the effect of undoing such violation."'
14
While recognizing the constitutional prohibition on dual office holding,
141
the court declined to rule on the matter, finding that the election of university
trustees is a legislative function.142 Having determined the matter to be a power
of the legislature, the court held that it was beyond the purview of the court to
direct the legislature on how to perform its duties in that regard, as it was aware
of "no judicial ground upon which in this case we could declare the office of
trustee of the University vacated after the Legislature has undertaken to fill it, or
132. See Segars-Andrews, 387 S.C. at 123, 691 S.E.2d at 461 (citing Abbeville Cnty. Sch.
Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 67, 515 S.E.2d 535, 539 (1999)).
133. Yonce, 274 S.C. at 85, 261 S.E.2d at 305.
134. See id.
135. 194 S.C. 105, 9 S.E.2d 218 (1940).
136. Id. at 108-09, 9 S.E.2d at 219.
137. See id. at 107-08, 9 S.E.2d at 218-19 (citing S.C. CONST. art. 11, § 2 (renumbered 1971);
S.C. CONST. art. nI, § 24).
138. See id. at 109, 9 S.E.2d at 219 ("[W]e deem this case to be one in which the Court should
raise the same on its own motion and thereby make such disposition of the case as will fully accord
with the governmental principles involved.").
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 108, 9 S.E.2d at 218-19 (citing S.C. CONST. art. II, § 2 (renumbered 1971);
S.C. CONST. art. III, § 24).
142. See id. at 111,9 S.E.2d at 220.
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the office of Senator vacated, when the Senate, by its non-action, has otherwise
ruled."' 143 Most notably, the court affirmatively stated:
Just as it is not within the power of the General Assembly to reverse
a judicial decision by retroactive legislation, or to otherwise interfere
with or nullify the judicial process, so it is not within the power of this
Court to impinge upon the exercise by the Legislature of a power vested
in that body, merely because in the exercise of or failure to exercise that
power, some constitutional provision has been violated.t44
Similarly, in Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection Commission,
145
while the court did not raise separation of powers concerns sua sponte, it did
affirmatively state that, when the parties present the issue, "[the] Court must
analyze the claim."'146 Raised in the context of several constitutional challenges
to a decision of the Judicial Merit Selection Commission, 147 the court, in Segars-
Andrews, extensively discussed whether a separation of powers violation had
been conclusively demonstrated
148
In summary, the court must confront and dispense with separation of powers
concerns before proceeding, whether presented by the parties or by the subject
matter itself, as this issue affects the jurisdiction of the court. 149 In Fairfield,
despite having been fully briefed and argued by the parties, the court failed to
properly address or analyze the separation of powers concerns inherent in the
constitutional challenge.' 50 Given the significance of the constitutional territory
at stake in Fairfield, as well as the resulting uncertainty, a thorough and
exhaustive analysis should have been undertaken, and was even required by the
court's own precedent. 151
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 387 S.C. 109, 691 S.E.2d 453 (2010) (per curiam).
146. Id. at 123, 691 S.E.2d at 461.
147. Id. at 116,691 S.E.2d at 457.
148. See id. at 116-23,691 S.E.2d at 457-61.
149. Culbertson, 194 S.C. at 108-09, 9 S.E.2d at 219.
150. See Bd. of Trs. of the Sch. Dist. of Fairfield Cnty. v. State, 395 S.C. 276, 279, 718 S.E.2d
210, 211 (2011) (citing S.C. CONST. art. II, § 12).
151. See Segars-Andrews, 387 S.C. at 123, 691 S.E.2d at 461; Culbertson, 194 S.C. at 109, 9
S.E.2d at 219. Given the inherent conflict involved in the judicial branch dictating legislative
procedure, "the ends of justice [are] best subserved by recognizing the foregoing constitutional
limitations upon the field of judicial action as the fundamental and controlling reason" why such
challenges should not be adjudicated. Culbertson, 194 S.C. at 114, 9 S.E.2d at 221.
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3. Political Question Doctrine
a. Generally
While judicial involvement in a certain matter may not, by itself, violate or
obfuscate the requisite separation of powers, an issue may nonetheless be
nonjusticiable, as the court "may not... intervene in what is a political
question."' 152  The political question doctrine is a judicial construct and
prudential consideration whereby a court determines that certain allegations of
unconstitutional governmental conduct are inappropriate for judicial review,
despite all other jurisdictional and justiciability requirements having been
satisfied.1 53 Such a finding is based on a determination that the allegations at
issue are best left to the politically accountable branches of government and the
political process in general.15
In Baker v. Carr,155 the United States Supreme Court attempted to define
what issues or subject matters presented a nonjusticiable political question.
156
Acknowledging the "delicate exercise of constitutional interpretation" involved
in this analysis, as well as the need for case-by-case inquiry, the Baker Court
extracted the "analytical threads ' 157 present in its existing jurisprudence to
establish criteria for determining whether a particular issue constitutes a
nonjusticiable political question. 15 According to Baker, cases involving
political questions are marked by one or more of the following characteristics:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. 159
152. Segars-Andrews, 387 S.C. at 120, 691 S.E.2d at 459.
153. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES § 2.8.1, at
129 (3d ed. 2006).
154. See id.
155. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
156. See id. at 217.
157. Seeid. at 210-11.
158. Id. at 217.
159. Id.; see also Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597,
622-23 (1976) (discussing the proper contents of the political question doctrine).
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While each of these factors serves to independently test for the existence of a
political question, they are likely listed in descending order, both in terms of
their importance and the certainty they provide. 160
b. Justifications
Generally, the political question doctrine is a product and function of the
separation of powers. 61 Although it has long been understood to be the duty of
the judiciary to "say what the law is,' 62 the political question doctrine serves to
restrict the range of constitutional issues that courts may decide. 163 As such, the
doctrine necessitates that courts pass upon matters where the Constitution has
"entrusted ' 'l 64 the issue to a separate and coequal branch of government, 165 or the
electorate as a whole.166 With respect to such issues, the courts do not define the
constitutional limits. 167
As stated by Professor Alexander Bickel, the foundation of the political
question doctrine rests on "the Court's sense of lack of capacity, compounded in
unequal part[] of[, among other things,] ... the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt
of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw
strength from." 168 Moreover, the political question doctrine seeks to assign
constitutional decisions to the branches of government possessing superior
expertise in the particular area at issue. 169  While the constitutional and
prudential significance of the political question doctrine are derived from, and
justified by, the desire to limit the judiciary's role in a democratic society, 17 it is
clear that judicial restraint does not indicate or amount to judicial abdication.
171
Instead, it is important to emphasize that "judicial unwillingness to intrude upon
the domain of political questions emerges not as meek deference, but rather as
the judiciary's assertion of its role as the ultimate decider of constitutional
spheres of authority."
172
160. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004) (discussing the factors listed by the
Court in Baker).
161. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
162. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
163. See Nat Stem, The Political Question Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C. L. REV. 405, 405
(1984) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-16, at 72 (1978)).
164. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277.
165. See DuRant, supra note 122, at 539.
166. See Stem, supra note 163, at 405 (quoting TRIBE, supra note 163, § 3-16, at 72).
167. See id. (quoting TRIBE, supra note 163, § 3-16, at 72).
168. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 184 (1962).
169. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 153, § 2.8.2, at 132 (3d ed. 2006).
170. See DuRant, supra note 122, at 539.
171. See Stem, supra note 163, at 416.
172. Id. at 415.
2012]
19
Limehouse: Blinded by a Bright Line: An Analysis of the Fairfield Formula an
Published by Scholar Commons, 2012
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
c. Role in State Courts
While the controversy surrounding the substantive content and applicability
of the United States Supreme Court's political question jurisprudence "has
subsided in importance if not intensity,"' the precept of the political question
has not been without continued significance, as state supreme courts have
recognized the concept of inherently nonjusticiable constitutional matters and
have espoused their own political question doctrines. 174 Despite the fact that
some commentators have questioned the applicability of the federal political
question jurisprudence to state cases,1 75 it, or its rationale, has nevertheless been
adopted in many instances.1 76  Justice Brennan specifically encouraged state
courts to examine the rationales underlying "constitutional federal decisions and
use them as 'guideposts' when interpreting similar state issues." 
177
Although the various state formulations of the political question doctrine are
all but identical, consistent trends and "a certain parallelism '' 178 can be gleaned
from the approaches that state courts have taken. The most common, and least
controversial, of the trends is the reluctance of state courts to interject
themselves into the electoral process via the interpretation of electoral results.179
This seemingly logical application of the tests for a political question t80 has also
spilled over into the context of disputes involving the general machinery of
government.181 These parallel concerns related to the separation of powers have
"fostered the belief that the machinery of government should regulate itself with
minimal judicial interference." 182 More specifically, "state courts have avoided
dictating to the executive and legislative branches how government should be
structured and how decisions should be made."'
' 83
While, generally, a challenged governmental act is removed from the
domain of the political question doctrine when it violates an express
constitutional prohibition, t84 "state courts have been particularly reluctant to
review legislative decisions that are not impermissible in substance but are
173. Id. at 406.
174. Id. at 406-07.
175. DuRant, supra note 122, at 540; see also Stem, supra note 163, at 422 (noting the refusal
of state courts to "slavishly parrot the federal judiciary's conception of political questions").
176. See, e.g., S.C. Pub. Interest Found. v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm'n, 369 S.C. 139,
142, 632 S.E.2d 277, 278 (2006) (adopting the framework from Baker).
177. DuRant, supra note 122, at 540 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977)).
178. Stem, supra note 163, at 407.
179. See id. at 408 (citations omitted).
180. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962)) (describing Baker's formulation as independent tests for the existence of a
political question).
181. See Stem, supra note 163, at 412-15 (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 412.
183. Id.
184. See id.
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challenged as having been reached or enacted in contravention of a
constitutionally prescribed process."'' 85 In abstaining from such disputes, courts
often emphasize that such an intrusion is unwarranted, as passing upon the
wisdom or advisability of a particular legislative procedure would ignore state
constitutions' textual commitments to the legislative branch for determining its
own procedure. 186  To do so would be disrespectful to a coequal branch of
government and would jeopardize the independence required by the separation
of powers doctrine.1
87
A salient example of a state court's reliance on the political question
doctrine in such a scenario can be seen in Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center
Authority v. City of Birmingham.188  In Birmingham-Jefferson, the Supreme
Court of Alabama held that the question of whether the phrase "a majority of
each house" required a bill to be passed by a majority of a quorum, or by a
majority of votes cast in the presence of a quorum, presented a nonjusticiable
political question more properly left to the legislative branch. 189 In addressing a
"practice of 'local legislative courtesy,"' where members "abstain from voting
on a bill of purely local application unless the bill is applicable to the legislator's
county,"' 19 the court noted that, while separation of powers concerns precluded it
from exercising jurisdiction, 191 the issue also constituted a political question.
192
In light of the similar facts but fundamentally different holdings in Birmingham-
Jefferson and Fairfield, an analysis by the majority in Fairfield explaining its
rejection of the arguments addressed in Birmingham-Jefferson would have
provided much needed clarity and guidance.
d. South Carolina's Political Question Doctrine
In South Carolina, while the political question doctrine has been discussed
relatively frequently in certain contexts,193 some commentators contend that it
has remained conspicuously absent in others.194 Recently, however, in both
185. Id. at 414.
186. See id. at 414-15 (citing Malone v. Meekins, 650 P.2d 351, 356-57 (Alaska 1982); Leek
v. Theis, 539 P.2d 304, 328 (Kan. 1975); Gilbert v. Gladden, 432 A.2d 1351, 1354-55 (N.J. 1981)).
187. See id. (quoting Malone, 650 P.2d at 356-57; Leek, 539 P.2d at 328).
188. 912 So. 2d 204 (Ala. 2005).
189. See id. at 221.
190. Id. at 210 & n.5 (a practice eerily similar to the one at issue in Fairfield).
191. See id. at 212.
192. Id. at 221. Specifically, the court held that the constitutional challenge involved: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,
id. at 218, (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the
question, id. at 219, and (3) a lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government, id. at 220.
193. See, e.g., Beaufort Cnty. v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 395 S.C. 366, 376-77, 718
S.E.2d 432, 438 (2011) (holding that whether the funds appropriated for conducting a 2012
Presidential Preference Primary were sufficient presents a nonjusticiable political question).
194. See, e.g., DuRant, supra note 122, at 540 (arguing that, unlike the lower courts, the South
Carolina Supreme Court should have refused to decide a public school reform issue in Abbeville
20121
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Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection Commission195 and South Carolina
Public Interest Foundation v. Judicial Merit Selection Commission (SCPIF),196
the South Carolina Supreme Court has discussed the political question doctrine
at length. 197 Having already adopted the Baker framework in SCPIF,"9 the
Segars-Andrews court again acknowledged the familiar adage that the
nonjusticiability of a political question is essentially a product of the separation
of powers.199 Further noting the parallels between South Carolina's political
question doctrine and its federal counterpart, the court stated that "[t]he
fundamental characteristic of a nonjusticiable 'political question' is that its
adjudication would place a court in conflict with a coequal branch of
govemment."
2°°
Noting that courts should not rule on questions that are predominantly
political rather than judicial in nature, the South Carolina Supreme Court, in
Segars-Andrews, emphasized that it has declined to pass on issues involving
authority that has been committed by the constitution to a coequal branch of
government.20 1 Determining whether a particular matter has been delegated by
the constitution to the legislative or executive branches, or whether the action at
issue exceeds whatever authority has been delegated, requires case-by-case
inquiry and amounts to "a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation.
' 2 °2
Despite its stated hesitation to venture into such issues, the court has
obfuscated the doctrine somewhat in stating that, upon a finding of
nonjusticiability, "consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately
foreclosed, ' 2° 3 as "[i]t is the duty of [the] court to interpret and declare the
meaning of the constitution." 2° 4 Noting that Sloan v. Hardee20 5 illustrated the
fundamental distinction between a legal controversy and a political one,206 the
County School District v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 515 S.E.2d 535 (1999), based on the political question
doctrine).
195. 387 S.C. 109, 691 S.E.2d 453 (2010).
196. 369 S.C. 139, 632 S.E.2d 277 (2006).
197. See SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 142-45, 632 S.E.2d at 278-79; Segars-Andrews, 387 S.C. at 120-
23, 691 S.E.2d at 459-61.
198. See SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 142, 632 S.E.2d at 278 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-
11 (1962)).
199. See Segars-Andrews, 387 S.C. at 121, 691 S.E.2d at 460 (quoting SCPIF, 369 S.C. at
142, 632 S.E.2d at 278).
200. Id. at 121-22, 691 S.E.2d at 460 (quoting SCPlF, 369 S.C. at 142-43, 632 S.E.2d at 278)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
201. See id. at 122, 691 S.E.2d at 460 (citing SCPIF, 369 S.C. at 143, 632 S.E.2d at 278-79).
202. Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11).
203. Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 198) (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. Id. at 123, 691 S.E.2d at 461 (citing Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 67,
515 S.E.2d 535, 539 (1999)).
205. 371 S.C. 495, 640 S.E.2d 457 (2007).
206. See id. at 500, 640 S.E.2d at 459-60 (citations omitted). Sloan involved a claim that
three commissioners for the South Carolina Department of Transportation were serving consecutive
terms in violation of state statute. Id. at 497,640 S.E.2d at 458. The court in Sloan emphasized that
this presented a legal rather than political question, as the sole issue was whether the commissioners
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court in Segars-Andrews emphasized that it "is duty bound to review the actions
of the Legislature when it is alleged in a properly filed suit that such actions are
unconstitutional." 2°7 As such, "when the unconstitutionality of an act is clear to
[the] court, beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is its plain duty to say so.''2°8 In
such instances, the requisite case-by-case inquiry "necessarily proceeds to the
point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its
breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be
judicially molded.
' 2 °9
e. Applicability to Fairfield
As indicated and explained by South Carolina's political question
jurisprudence, the existence of a political question can largely be determined by
applying the factors or tests set forth in Baker.2 10  The three Baker factors
pertinent in Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority2 1' merited, but did not
receive, a similar analysis by the court in Fairfield.
i. Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment
In applying the first factor to the constitutional challenge in Fairfield, it must
be determined whether there has been a "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department. ' 2t2  While,
admittedly, such a task involves "a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation, ' ,213 further analysis of the United States Supreme Court's political
question jurisprudence proves instructive. ,
In Nixon v. United States,214 the Court was presented with the question of
whether Senate Rule XI, which allows for an evidentiary hearing before a Senate
committee, rather than an impeachment hearing before the full Senate, was
215unconstitutional. The Court held that the matter presented a nonjusticiablepolitical question,216 as the language of the Impeachment Trial Clause217
were serving in violation of the statute, and defining the meaning of the statute was clearly within
the purview of the court. Id. at 500, 640 S.E.2d at 460.
207. Segars-Andrews, 387 S.C. at 123, 691 S.E.2d at 460-61.
208. Id. at 123, 691 S.E.2d at 461 (quoting Elliott v. Sligh, 233 S.C. 161, 165, 103 S.E.2d 923,
925 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Id. at 122, 691 S.E.2d at 460 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 210-11 (1962)).
210. See, e.g., S.C. Pub. Interest Found. v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm'n (SCPIF), 369
S.C. 139, 142, 632 S.E.2d 277, 278 (2006) (citing and adopting the framework from Baker).
211. See Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 215
(Ala. 2005).
212. Id. at 214-15 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
213. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
214. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
215. See id. at 226 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6).
216. See id.
217. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6.
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indicates a textual commitment of the matter to the Senate. 218  The Court
explained that, in order to determine whether there is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of an issue to a coordinate political department, a
court must, at the threshold of the case, interpret the text in question. 219 The
Court concluded both that the first sentence of the Impeachment Trial Clause
amounts to a grant of authority to the Senate, and that the word "sole" indicates
that the authority is vested in the Senate and nowhere else.220 The Court held,
therefore, that the inclusion of the word "sole" in the Impeachment Trial Clause
is evidence of a textual commitment, meaning that the Senate's impeachment
power is not subject to judicial review.
221
In Nixon, the Court's extensive comparison of the case to, and
222
distinguishment from, Powell v. McCormack is also illustrative. In Powell,
the Court addressed whether the constitutional commitment to the House of
Representatives of the authority to judge the qualifications of its members
prevented judicial review of such a matter. 223  While Article I, Section 5,
provides that each body "shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members, ' 224 Article I, Section 2, outlines three
requirements for membership in the House of Representatives. 225 The Court
held that the inclusion of those three specific membership requirements imparted
"a precise, limited nature"226 to the word "qualifications. 227 Consequently, the
Court determined that the House of Representatives' argument that its authority
to judge the qualifications of its members constituted a textually demonstrable
commitment of unreviewable authority was overcome by the existence of the
separate provision specifying the only qualifications which might be imposed for
membership. 
228
However, in Nixon, there was no separate provision of the Constitution that
would have been defeated by granting the Senate final authority to interpret and
determine the meaning of the word try in the Impeachment Trial Clause.229 The
Court, in Nixon, acknowledged that, although courts do possess the power to
review legislative and executive actions that surpass identifiable textual limits,
the word try in the Impeachment Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable
218. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229.
219. See id. at 228.
220. See id. at 229.
221. See id. The Court also examined whether there were any "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving" the political question which might keep the controversy from
being nonjusticiable. Id. at 228-30 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
222. See id. at 236-37 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)).
223. Powell, 395 U.S. at 519, 521.
224. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 237 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5).
225. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).
226. See id. (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 522).
227. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
228. See id. (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 548).
229. Id.
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textual limit on the authority committed to the Senate to conduct impeachment
proceedings. 230 As a result, the Court concluded that the question of how the
Senate may, within the bounds of the Constitution, try an impeachment
amounted to a nonjusticiable political question.
231
The question presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court in Fairfield,
stated simply, was whether the rules and procedures of the General Assembly for
overriding gubernatorial vetoes violated identifiable textual limits. 232  As in
Segars-Andrews, the structure of the South Carolina Constitution may also
provide the analytical framework for resolving or disposing of the challenge in
Fairfield, and in other cases involving the court's intervention in the legislative
process.
23 3
It has been established that the legislature's veto override authority "must be
considered in conjunction with the provisions of Article 3, Section 12, which
provides, in part, that 'each house shall choose its own officers, determine its
rules of procedure,' etc. '' 234 Although the General Assembly is fully empowered
by the constitution to determine its own rules and procedures, [n]either
House may by its rules ignore constitutional restraints." 236  Within such
prescribed limitations, however, "all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House" and are "absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal. 237  While the power and authority of the General
Assembly is plenary with regards to all matters of legislation, unless prohibited
by some provision of the Constitution, 238 provisions of the state constitution are.. . ... 239
not to be construed to impose limitations beyond their clear meanin29 espite
the supposedly "unambiguous language in article LV, section 21," 2 evidence of
a provision's clear meaning can be gleaned from its previous understanding and
application by the branch of government within whose purview lies all matters
related to legislation. 241 In support of such evidence, both the South Carolina
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have found that the
230. Id. at 237-38 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
231. See id. at 238.
232. See Bd. of Trs. of the Sch. Dist. of Fairfield Cnty. v. State, 395 S.C. 276, 279, 718 S.E.2d
210, 211 (2011).
233. See Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm'n, 387 S.C. 109, 118, 691 S.E.2d
453, 458 (2010).
234. State ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 21, 186 S.E. 625, 630 (1936) (quoting S.C.
CONST. art. IIl, § 12).
235. See S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12.
236. Coleman, 181 S.C. at 22, 186 S.E. at 630.
237. Id. (citing United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)).
238. See id. at 16, 186 S.E. at 628 (quoting Clarke v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 177 S.C. 427, 435,
181 S.E. 481, 484 (1935)).
239. See Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm'n, 387 S.C. 109, 118, 691 S.E.2d
453, 458 (2010) (citing State v. Broad River Power Co., 177 S.C. 240, 265, 181 S.E. 41, 52 (1935)).
240. Bd. of Trs. of the Sch. Dist. of Fairfield Cnty. v. State, 395 S.C. 276, 281, 718 S.E.2d
210, 213 (2011) (citing S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21).
241. See Williams v. Morris, 320 S.C. 196, 205-06,464 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1995).
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judiciary should accord weight to previous legislative practices and
interpretations.242  Unlike Powell, which involved express and identifiable
qualifications for membership in Congress, 243 there is no provision of the South
Carolina Constitution expressly defining or explaining the requirements of the
phrase "two-thirds of that house.'' 44 Moreover, no other provision of the South
Carolina Constitution "would be defeated by allowing the [General Assembly]
the final authority over its internal voting rules and procedures." Indeed, such
a result would be consistent with article III, section 12, the very provision the
court previously stated was to be considered and interpreted alongside the
General Assembly's veto override authority.
2
Given that the constitution contains no specific numerical or other limitation
on the manner in which the General Assembly might properly interpret the
phrase "two-thirds of that house," and because the constitution expressly grants
to the General Assembly the power to determine its own rules of procedure,
247
the question of whether the requisite "two-thirds of that house" has voted to
override a governor's veto must be governed by, and decided according to, the
rules of the General Assembly. 248 A complete analysis of the political question
jurisprudence leads to the conclusion that there may well have been a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment to the legislative branch to determine
what constitutes "two-thirds of that house," such that it renders review of the
General Assembly's internal voting procedures a nonjusticiable political
question.
ii. Lack of Judicially Discoverable and Manageable
Standards
The second applicable Baker factor, the "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" for resolving the dispute, 24 9 provides further insight into
242. Id. (citing Okanogan, Methow Tribes v. United States (The Pocket Veto Case), 279 U.S.
655, 689 (1929) ("Long settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a
proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this character."); Powers v. State Educ. Fin.
Comm'n, 222 S.C. 433, 441-42, 73 S.E.2d 456, 459 (1952) (stating that "[piroper consideration
must be given" to previous constitutional interpretations by the General Assembly)).
243. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969).
244. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21.
245. See Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 217-
18 (Ala. 2005).
246. See State ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 21, 186 S.E. 625, 630 (1936) (quoting
S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12).
247. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12.
248. See Birmingham-Jefferson, 912 So. 2d at 217-18.
249. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit
Selection Comm'n, 387 S.C. 109, 122, 691 S.E.2d 453, 460 (2010) ("In determining whether a
question is political and nonjusticiable, '. . . the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial
determination [is a] dominant consideration[]."' (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55
(1939))).
26
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the political question analysis and determination. 250 While "[l]aws promulgated
by the Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc," the law as
"pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned
distinctions," as "judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule."
25 1
Nixon provides even clearer guidance on the application of the second Baker
252factor. Maintaining that his challenge to the constitutionality of Senate Rule
XI was justiciable, Nixon claimed that the word try in the Impeachment Trial
Clause amounted to a constitutional mandate that an impeachment proceeding be
253conducted in the nature of a judicial trial. Rejecting Nixon's argument, the
Court held that multiple definitions could be assigned to the word try and that the
term consequently "lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable
standard" for courts to apply in reviewing the legislative action.2 A Furthermore,
noting that "the concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political
department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [a dispute], ' 255 the Court
held that the lack of such a clear standard further strengthened its conclusion that
there had also been a textual commitment of the matter to a coordinate political
branch.256
The South Carolina Constitution, as the sole source of any limitation on the
General Assembly's power, 257 offers no clear standard by which the judiciary
can review the General Assembly's rules and procedures with regard to veto
override votes. 258 As noted by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Birmingham-
Jefferson, determining whether judicial review and intervention is appropriate
involves "a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of
the history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to
judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of
the possible consequences of judicial action., 259 In Fairfield, such factors, if
considered, would have counseled in favor of the judiciary's avoidance of the
250. See DuRant, supra note 122, at 540 (citing Brennan, supra note 177, at 502).
251. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004) (discussing the "lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards" factor enunciated in Baker (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at
217) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
252. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-30 (1993).
253. See id. at 229.
254. Id. at 229-30.
255. Id. at 228; see also Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912
So. 2d 204, 218 n.17 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228-29).
256. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228-29.
257. See Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm'n, 387 S.C. 109, 118, 691 S.E.2d
453, 458 (2010) (citing Moseley v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 26-27, 39 S.E.2d 133, 137 (1946)).
258. This is the same situation as in Birmingham-Jefferson, where the Supreme Court of
Alabama, interpreting the Alabama Constitution, held that there were no standards for "the judicial
branch to review the legislature's voting rules and procedures with respect to the legislature's
determination that 'a majority of each house' voted." Birmingham-Jefferson, 912 So. 2d at 218-19.
259. Id. at 219 n.18 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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issue, as the facts of the case obviously indicate the susceptibility of the
provision to several interpretations. 26 Further, the South Carolina Constitution
does not explain or define the phrase "two-thirds of that house," and the General
Assembly's authority to determine its rules of procedure, particularly with regard
to voting, is not expressly limited by any specific provision or text of the
constitution. As evidenced by, if nothing else, the resulting ambiguities, no
manageable standard exists, or has been articulated as of yet, by which the
judicial branch can review the legislature's veto override procedure at issue in
Fairfield. Consequently, the absence of a judicially discoverable and
manageable standard for resolving the issue is indicative of its nonjusticiability
261as a political question.
iii. Lack of the Respect Due a Coordinate Branch of
Government
The final Baker factor implicated by the facts in Fairfield, "the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government," 262 further indicates the possible
presence of a political question. While mere disrespect for a coordinate branch
263of government is not sufficient to create a political question, it may
nevertheless be probative.2 4
By invalidating the General Assembly's actions in overriding gubernatorial
vetoes in Fairfield, the judicial branch may have demonstrated a lack of respect
for the legislative branch, as the constitution provides that each house of the
General Assembly shall independently determine its rules of procedure.
265
Given that constitutional provision, coupled with the specific separation of
powers mandate,266 the judicial branch "should presume that the [members of the
General Assembly have complied] with their oath of office [in] determin[ing]
and apply[ing] those rules. Instead, overturning and directing legislative
procedure is indicative of a lack of the respect due the legislature.
268
260. Compare Bd. of Trs. of the Sch. Dist. of Fairfield Cnty. v. State, 395 S.C. 276, 279, 718
S.E.2d 210, 211 (2011), with id. at 286, 718 S.E.2d at 215 (Toal, J., dissenting).
261. See Birmingham-Jefferson, 912 So. 2d at 218-19; Segars-Andrews, 387 S.C. at 122, 691
S.E.2d at 460 ("In determining whether a question is political and nonjusticiable, '... . the lack of
satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination [is a] dominant consideration[]."' (quoting Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939))).
262. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
263. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 390 (1990) ("If it were, every judicial
resolution of a constitutional challenge to a [legislative] enactment would be impermissible.").
264. See id.; Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
265. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12.
266. See id. art. I, § 8.
267. Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 219 (Ala.
2005).
268. See id.
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In the conflict at issue in Fairfield, there is no explicit constitutional
provision binding the General Assembly to a certain method or procedure for
determining what constitutes "two-thirds of that house" for purposes of veto
overrides. Increased judicial intervention in the legislative process, however,
will lead to uncertainty and instability as to actions of the political departments
of government.
269
The judicial branch should not question the determination of the General
Assembly as to whether a veto was overridden by the requisite constitutional
supermajority. 27  Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in United States v. Munoz-
Flores, stated that "[m]utual regard between the coordinate branches, and the
interest of certainty, both demand that official representations regarding matters
of internal process be accepted at face value. ' 272  Given the inherent
intrusiveness and disrespect for a coequal branch of government involved in the
judiciary reviewing and dictating the legislative procedure to be used in the
General Assembly, the issue in Fairfield likely presents a nonjusticiable political
question.
2 73
Furthermore, the South Carolina Supreme Court has previously declared a
statute that allowed the General Assembly to direct circuit judges to work within
the executive branch to be invalid as an intrusion on, and limitation of, the
judicial branch's authority. 274  For the court to, then, direct the requisite
procedures of the General Assembly may, arguably, indicate a new willingness
to raise the banner of separation of powers when its own authority is
compromised, but disregard it when the matter involves the authority of another
branch. Such a paradoxical result, without more, rejects the cooperative role the
three branches must assume in enforcing and delineating the proper and requisite
separation and balance of powers.275 More appropriately, as the Supreme Court
269. See id. at 220-21 ("We, like the United States Supreme Court in Field v. Clark, are
persuaded that uncertainty and instability would result if every person were free to 'hunt through the
journals of a legislature to determine whether a statute, properly certified by the speaker of the
house and the president of the senate, and approved by the governor, is a statute or not,' and the
internal proceedings of the legislature when passing a bill were to be subject to judicial challenge."
(quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 677 (1892))); Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection
Comm'n, 387 S.C. 109, 122, 691 S.E.2d 453, 460 (2010) (noting the importance placed on
"attributing finality to the action of the political departments" (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433, 454-55 (1939) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
270. See Birmingham-Jefferson, 912 So. 2d at 221.
271. 495 U.S. 385, 408 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
272. Id. at 410.
273. See Birmingham-Jefferson, 912 So. 2d at 221 (holding that judicial review of a
legislature's determination "express[es] a lack of the respect due that coordinate branch of
government," making the question nonjusticiable).
274. See State ex rel. McLeod v. Yonce, 274 S.C. 81, 88, 261 S.E.2d 303, 306 (1979) (per
curiam).
275. See id. at 87-88, 261 S.E.2d at 306 (citing 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 271
(2012) (Part VII.C.2.a. "Impermissibility of imposition of nonjudicial functions on the judiciary"))
(noting that when a branch acts beyond the scope of its powers, as would be permitted by the statute
at issue, such action goes against the constitutional mandate of separation of powers).
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of Alabama noted, "just as [the] [c]ourt will declare legislative usurpation of the
judicial power violative of the separation-of-powers provision of [the]
Constitution ... so it must decline to exercise the judicial power when to do so
would infringe upon the exercise of the legislative power." 276 Having expressly
277
declined to overturn an action of the General Assembly in Culbertson, despite
an explicit constitutional provision seemingly providing it with the authority to
do so, the court, arguably, has no more authority in the context of veto overrides
to declare an act of the General Assembly void merely because in the exercise of
that power a purportedly unambiguous constitutional provision has been
violated.
iv. Summary
Based on an application of the political question doctrine, the South Carolina
Constitution contains no explicit, unambiguous, or identifiable textual limitation
on the General Assembly's authority with regard to its veto override procedures
such as to permit judicial review. Moreover, given the ambiguity implicit in the
278rule established in Fairfield, there appears to be a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the dispute. Finally, for the
court to affirmatively declare and mandate a specific veto override procedure to
be followed by the General Assembly arguably demonstrates a lack of the
respect due a coordinate branch of government.
IV. IMPACT AND EFFECTS OF THE FAIRFIELD FORMULA
A. "Stability of Existing Laws"279
Is the court's holding merely prospective in application or is it to apply
retrospectively as well? If the court's ruling was intended to apply
prospectively, and simply as a guide to legislators with regard to future override
votes, existing laws would not be subject to challenge based solely on the
manner in which they were enacted, in particular the number of votes by which a
gubernatorial veto of the legislation was overridden. However, if the court's
holding was intended to apply retrospectively, a multitude of existing, and
currently enforceable, laws may now be subject to challenge. Chief Justice Toal
276. Birmingham-Jefferson, 912 So. 2d at 212 (internal citations omitted).
277. See Culbertson v. Blatt, 194 S.C. 105, 107-09, 9 S.E.2d 218, 218-19 (1940) (declining to
review the General Assembly's election of defendants to the Board of Trustees of the University of
South Carolina, wherein defendants were each later elected to separate public offices allegedly in
violation of the South Carolina Constitution).
278. See Bd. of Trs. of the Sch. Dist. of Fairfield Cnty. v. State, 395 S.C. 276, 284, 718 S.E.2d
210, 214 (2011); Petition for Rehearing, supra note 23, at 7 (discussing potential "absurd results"
under the Fairfield formula).
279. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 288, 718 S.E.2d at 216 (Toal, C.J., dissenting) (alteration not
indicated).
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wrote in her dissent of the need for ensuring the "stability of existing laws.,
280
One might infer from such a statement that she believed that the majority's
holding was intended to apply retrospectively. 281  Moreover, the Board
acknowledged concerns in its brief that the outcome it sought may affect the
validity of numerous other laws enacted in the same fashion as Act 308,
subsequently inviting the court to "craft a decree and opinion that [would]
promote the general welfare and preserve stability in the law."
282
If the court's holding in Fairfield is indeed to be applied retrospectively, one
must consider what laws may now be subject to challenge as having been
enacted in a manner contrary to the Fairfield formula. While the pervasiveness
of the General Assembly's "long-held precedent" 283 of overriding vetoes with
less than an affirmative vote of two-thirds of a quorum was a matter of factual
dispute among the parties, 284 as well as among the Justices,285 one need not
search back farther than the 117th session of the General Assembly286 to find
more than twenty examples of existing laws that now may be constitutionally
287infirm under the Fairfield formula. While predominantly local in character,
many of these existing laws deal with matters ranging from the establishment,
elimination, or consolidation of public bodies
288 to the authorization of bonds. 289
Under the court's ruling, for example, if a law creating or altering a board or
commission is deemed invalid, the contracts it entered into or the bonds that it
issued may then be deemed suspect. 290 While most laws implicated by the
280. Id.
281. See id. Chief Justice Toal stated that she would uphold the legislative override of a
gubernatorial veto partly "in the interest of promoting the stability of existing laws." Id.
282. See Final Brief for Plaintiff at 18 n.4, Fairfield, 395 S.C. 276, 718 S.E.2d 210 (No.
27035).
283. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 278, 718 S.E.2d at 211 (quoting S.J. Res. 135, 118th Gen. Assemb.,
2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2010); 2010 S.C. SENATE J. 1608) (internal quotation marks omitted).
284. See Final Joint Brief, supra note 43, at 15 & n.4.
285. See Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 286, 718 S.E.2d at 215 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
286. 2007 to 2008.
287. See, e.g., 2010 S.C. Acts 315 (authorizing the Board of Trustees of the Kershaw County
School District to issue up to $2.5 million in general obligation bonds, passed by overriding a
gubernatorial veto by a vote of 2-to-0 in the House, [2010] 5 S.C. HOUSE J. 5510); 2007 S.C. Acts
130 (increasing the membership and composition of the Charleston County Aviation Authority,
passed by overriding a gubernatorial veto by a vote of 12-to-0 in the House, [2007] 4 S.C. HOUSE J.
3905 (currently the subject of pending litigation)).
288. See, e.g., 2011 S.C. Acts 86 (establishing the Kershaw County Housing Authority, passed
by overriding a gubernatorial veto by a vote of 2-to-1 in the House, [2011] 5 S.C. HOUSE J. 5619-
20).
289. See, e.g., 2010 S.C. Acts 2891 (authorizing the Board of Trustees of the Fort Mill School
District Number 4 to issue up to $2 million in general obligation bonds, passed by overriding a
gubernatorial veto by a vote of 6-to-1 in the House, [2010] 3 S.C. HOUSE J. 2948).
290. See Seanna Adcox, SC high court: Vetoes are statewide business, THE STATE, Aug. 30,
2011 (according to then-State Senate President Pro Tempore Glenn McConnell, the court's opinion
in Fairfield "throws a shadow of doubt on" existing laws, suggesting that "[i]f this is no good, those
are no good" (internal quotation marks omitted)) (published online and no longer available) (on file
with author).
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court's decision originated as local legislation, this fact does not necessarily limit
the scope of the ruling's impact, but rather potentially opens a floodgate of
constitutional challenges to, for instance, both the validity of a statutorily created
public body and the authority with which it conducts business.291
Chief Justice Toal may have been expressing her concerns for "the stability
of existing laws" in light of the theoretical underpinnings of the enrolled bill
doctrine. 292 Though argued extensively to the court,293 the majority opinion
failed to address or discuss the doctrine. While a reading of State ex rel. Hoover
v. Town Council of Chester294 shows that Fairfield likely falls within the
constitutional prerequisites exception, 295 it is now uncertain whether the enrolled
bill doctrine will be altered by the logical extension of the Fairfield formula and
rationale to votes on initial passage of legislation.
B. Potential Application to Votes for Initial Passage
Finally, the Fairfield formula may well apply not only to veto overrides, but
to all actions of the General Assembly. 296  The only two variables in the
Fairfield formula are: first, the required percentage or threshold; and second, the
actual number of votes cast.29 7  The court acknowledged that, "absent a
constitutional [mandate] to the contrary, the legislature acts... through majority
vote.''98 As the constitution states that a majority of each house constitutes a
quorum to transact business, 299 "[a] quorum, therefore, possesses the power of
the whole body in all matters of business wherein the action of a larger
291. See id.
292. See, e.g., Med. Soc'y of S.C. v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 334 S.C. 270, 278, 513 S.E.2d 352,
356-57 (1999) (citing Beaufort Cnty. v. Jasper Cnty., 220 S.C. 469, 487, 68 S.E.2d 421, 430
(1951); State v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 467, 150 S.E. 269, 273 (1929)) ('The enrolled bill rule
provides that an Act ratified by the presiding officers of the General Assembly, approved by the
Governor, and enrolled in the Office of the Secretary of State is conclusively presumed to have been
properly passed. Such an Act is not subject to impeachment by evidence outside the Act as enrolled
to show it was not passed in compliance with the law."); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 677 (1892)
(holding that the enrolled bill doctrine is a logical function of the need for certainty in the laws,
especially "after the public have given faith to their validity" (quoting Weeks v. Smith, 18 A. 325,
327 (Me. 1889)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
293. See Brief of Defendant State of S.C. at 15, 17, Bd. of Trs. of the Sch. Dist. of Fairfield
Cnty. v. State, 395 S.C. 276, 718 S.E.2d 210 (2011) (No. 27035) (arguing that the enrolled bill rule
should apply, making the veto override issue a nonjusticiable political question).
294. 39 S.C. 307, 17 S.E. 752 (1893).
295. See id. at 317, 17 S.E. at 755 (stating that while the court may not "inquire into what the
journals of the two houses may show as to the successive steps which may have been taken in the
passage of the original bill," the court still has the power "to inquire into those prerequisites fixed
by the Constitution, and of which prerequisites the journals of the two houses are required to furnish
the evidence").
296. See Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 284, 718 S.E.2d at 214.
297. See id.
298. Id. at 279, 718 S.E.2d at 211.
299. S.C. CONST. art. HlI, § 11.
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proportion of the entire membership is not clearly and expressly required. '' °
The court's ruling in Fairfield requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds of a
minimum quorum for a valid veto override. 30 1 By ignoring, and implicitly
rejecting, the principle of acquiescence as an act of agreement in Fairfield,
would the same standard not apply to all actions of the General Assembly? By
logical extension and a "plain reading"3°2 of the majority's opinion, Fairfield has
likely established a participation quorum requirement for all actions of the
General Assembly. The base threshold of the Fairfield participation quorum is
the affirmative vote of the requisite percentage-either a majority or two-
thirds-of a minimum quorum. Anything less than the minimum number of
required votes, under the court's formula, will be constitutionally infirm. 30 3 This
analysis is reinforced by the court's use of specific language from Morton
stating, "If the rule is the mere majority rule, then a majority of the quorum
present and acting is intended .... ,304
V. CONCLUSION
Although the foregoing indicates several constitutional concerns with regard
to Fairfield, and while the wisdom or appropriateness of the court's decision to
intervene, or even the accuracy of the court's decision, may be disputed, as noted
by the United States Supreme Court in reviewing Smith: "The conformity with
the state Constitution of the proceedings in the enactment of the law is a question
for the determination of the State court, and its judgment is final.,
305
Nevertheless, when confronted with the floodgate of litigation likely, and already
beginning, to ensue from its opinion in Fairfield, the court may later find it
appropriate to revisit the issue and possibly "'retreat[]' from the 'province of the
legislative branch' and 'return[]"' the issue presented in this case to "'its proper
forum'-the legislature.' 3°6 At a minimum, the court could offer clarity and
guidance on all of the issues it chose to ignore, such as the separation of powers
doctrine, the political question doctrine, and the enrolled bill rule, as well as
correct the inconsistencies in its existing jurisprudence. The court's application
of the plain meaning rule, as an absolute, seems to have absolved the majority
from their responsibility to interpret the constitution so as to give effect to its
300. Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324, 328, 45 S.E. 821, 823 (1903).
301. See Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 284, 718 S.E.2d at 214.
302. Id. at 279, 718 S.E.2d at 211.
303. See generally M. P. FOLLETT, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 179-
200 (1896) (regarding the potential for obstruction under such a formula).
304. Fairfield, 395 S.C. at 281 n.2, 718 S.E.2d at 212 n.2 (quoting Morton, Bliss & Co. v.
Comptroller Gen., 4 S.C. 430, 463 (1873), overruled in part by Weaver v. Recreation Dist., 328
S.C. 83, 492 S.E.2d 79 (1997)).
305. State ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 24, 186 S.E. 625, 631 (1936) (quoting Smith
v. Jennings, 206 U.S. 276, 278 (1907)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
306. Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 213 (Ala.
2005) (quoting Ex Parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002)).
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original intent and meaning. While both convenient and generally accurate, such
a rule should not prevent an analysis of other constitutional issues or a review of
other extrinsic sources for guidance in interpretation. Finally, the court's failure
to address the effects of its bright line rule and formula has resulted in significant
uncertainty with regard to both existing laws and legislative procedure.
Thomas A. Limehouse, Jr.
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